71
5:0
51
70
careful note of the conditions prevailing. The city seemed to me to be in a very prosperous state. There was a large number of ships in the harbour, the shops were bright and prosperous looking and they and the streets generally were far cleaner than they had been on the occasion of my last visit some three years ago. I have little doubt that the Canton authorities are right in their frank statement that, although the inconvenience was at first very great and is still not inconsiderable, Canton is learning to do without Hong Kong. Hong Kong is undoubtedly losing trades which it will find it very hard to regain, although, when normal conditions are restored, Hong Kong is bound to have its full share in Canton's prosperity and, given peace in the province, the trade of both places should expand enormously. Mr. Sung informs me that in the last few months the revenue has automatically increased from 1,200,000 dollars to over 4 million dollars merely because the people have been at peace, and it continues to grow. I saw a number of soldiers drilling in very good formation at the parade ground at the foot of the White Cloud Mountains, and I was informed that all troops were now outside the city. The strikers' pickets wear neat dark blue uniforms with leather belts. As regards the members of the council, I feel that they are quite sincere in their desire for a settlement, with the exception perhaps of Mr. Wong Ching-wai, who. I imagine, is at heart irreconcilably anti-foreign. Mr. Wu wishes to settle, but he is doing his utmost to get the settlement in the form of a defeat and surrender of Hong Kong. I think that the consul-general is wrong in his estimate of Mr. Sung, who in my opinion exercises very considerable influence. This opinion was confirmed by conversations in Shameen. Mr. Wong Cheung-kuk took no part in the discussion, and Mr. Wong Ching-wai remained largely in the background as he knows no English and most of the conversations were not interpreted Mr. Wong Ching-wai is, I understand, 37 or 38 years of age and he looks hardly 30. The members of the council are all young men, Mr. Wu the oldest, being 39, and with the exception of Mr. Wu, they gave me the impression of being somewhat immature politicians, very anxious to learn, who would be grateful for friendly help and guidance.
December 23, 1925.
M. FLETCHER.
Note. I left Canton on the morning of the 23rd December in the U.S.S. "Pampanga on invitation of Captain Coustien and Commander Dugger, United States Navy.
should be taken to find out whether this task would be undertaken by the Chinese naval forces.
It is our unanimous opinion that---
1. The anti-British boycott is mainly attributable to the Red Russians at Canton, 2. If the existing situation is to be relieved, it is essential that they should be
removed.
We are very strongly of opinion that the British Government should take action at Moscow with a view to obtaining the removal from Kwangtung of all Bolsheviks.
If these suggestions are not practical politics, we cannot think of any other line of action than war with Cauton. Unless, however, America, France and Japan would co-operate (and preferably other maritime Powers, too), warlike action would jeopardise future commercial relations between Great Britain and China (and particularly between this colony and Canton),
It is our unanimous opinion that, if it is not considered practicable to adopt any of the suggestions which we have put forward, there is no method by which the boycott can be ended except by holding out until the existing Government of Canton either falls by disruption from within or is overthrown by some hostile Chinese general In this connection I would refer you to my telegram of the 13th January.
At present, therefore, the trade loan is our only weapon. Even at the risk of some eventual loss of money by the Government, it is necessary for the loan to be used generously for the benefit of the merchants, both British and Chinese in the colony.
Sir J. Jamieson and I are in close liaison, and there is free exchange of information between the colony and Canton and between Canton and Peking. There will no doubt be a similar exchange of information between the Colonial Office and Foreign Office.
The existing Government at Peking has no authority or influence over affairs in Kwangtung,
[F 242/1/10]
M. F.
ANNEX XVIII.
(A.)
ANNEX XVII.
Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. (Received, Colonial Office, January 26, 1926.)
Hong Kong, January 26, 1926.
(Telegraphic.) P.
I HAVE repeated this telegram (which refers to yours of the 16th January) to Peking, and Jamieson (who is here) asks that a copy may be sent to the Foreign Office as a reply to Foreign Office telegram to Peking No. 15 of the 12th January. The discussion between Admiral Sinclair, General Luard, Sir J. Jamieson, O'Malley and me was held on the 25th January.
Our suggestion is that steps should be taken by the British Government to find out :-
1. Whether it would he possible to induce the League of Nations (including the representative of China) unanimously to pass censure on the existing Government of Canton for its defiance of the treaties (in this connection I would refer you to my telegram of the 14th January).
2. Whether (in the event of the Canton Government ignoring such a censure) all the Powers would be willing to institute a boycott of Canton pending the removal of the anti-British boycott. His Majesty's Government might put to the Powers the point that it is an unfriendly act for non-British shipping to avoid Hong Kong at the dictation of the Strike Committee at Canton.
In order to render the suggested action effective, special measures would have to be taken to prevent Russian and Chinese ships from trading with Canton, Steps
Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Macleay (Peking). (No. 30.) (Telegraphic.)
CANTON situation.
Foreign Office, January 26, 1926.
There is growing anxiety here regarding deplorable conditions of British trade and residents in South China. At the same time there are indications that Soviet influence in Central and North China is waning. Is it impossible now to bridge the differences with Canton by using as intermediaries moderate Kuomintang and Cantonese influences in Peking or Shanghai, e.g., Tang Shao-yi, Liang Shib-yi? You should at least try to ascertain from such sources the real grievance of Canton. We are still very doubtful whether Bolshevik intrigue is sole cause, and inclined to wonde whether withholding of customs revenues, naval demonstrations in the past and con- tinued policy of threats in customs interests may not be at the bottom of the trouble. We do not ask for any immediate recommendations until you have heard from Mr. O'Malley and fully considered results of his discussions with Governor of Hong Kong and His Majesty's consul-general at Canton. But we must have some solution as soon as possible. Coercion we must presumably rule out; recognition would be contrary to our undertaking to respect the sovereignty and integrity of China and counter to general advice in your telegram No. 3. What, then, are the alternatives? When Parliament meets early next month we shall certainly be hard pressed and must be ready either with a practical policy or a convincing answer. As bearing on Canton question, what does seizure of native custom-house near Swatow, reported in press, imply and portend?
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